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CFO cultural background and stock price crash risk 
 
Abstract 
We investigate the relation between the cultural background of chief financial officers (CFOs) 
and stock price crash risk. Using a novel single-country setting in the U.K. market, we find 
robust evidence that CFOs from cultural backgrounds that emphasise uncertainty avoidance 
are negatively associated with firms’ stock price crash risk. Our evidence further shows that 
the effect of CFO uncertainty avoidance is more pronounced for firms with higher information 
asymmetry and riskiness, and when CFOs have a greater ability to influence firm decisions. 
Overall, the results shed light on the important role of CFO cultural background for firm 
policies and outcomes. 
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1. Introduction 
Stock price crash risk, which measures asymmetry in the return distribution, especially 
downside risk, is a fundamental issue in the asset pricing literature. It has received increasing 
attention from the media and regulators since the 2008 financial crisis. Given that extreme bad 
cases can lead to non-negligible losses for investors, examining the determinants of stock price 
crash risk is crucial. There is a vast prior literature that has documented how firm-level 
characteristics are attributable to variations in price crash risk. However, few studies have 
explored the impact of managers’ idiosyncratic characteristics, which are an important factor 
(Andreou et al., 2017; Kim et al., 2016b). Among those, cultural aspects have generally been 
underexplored, and this paper aims to fill that void in the literature. Specifically, we investigate 
whether and how the cultural background of chief financial officers (CFOs) affects future stock 
price crash risk. 
This study is motivated by upper echelons theory, which argues that the top 
management team’s background characteristics are key predictors of organisational behaviours 
and outcomes (Hambrick and Mason, 1984). Bertrand and Schoar (2003) document that top 
managers have statistically and economically significant effects on corporate behaviour. 
Furthermore, prior literature (e.g., Brochet et al., 2018; Du et al., 2017; Nguyen et al., 2018) 
has confirmed that cultural background has a significant influence on corporate decisions and 
outcomes (e.g., analysts’ forecasting accuracy), information disclosure, and firm performance 
under pressure. In this study, we focus on the uncertainty avoidance index (UAI) in Hofstede 
et al.’s (2010) cultural dimensions. Prior research suggests that, among Hofstede’s six cultural 
dimensions, uncertainty avoidance most strongly affects corporate financial decisions (e.g., 
Kwok and Tadesse, 2006; Kanagaretnam et al., 2014; Nguyen and Truong, 2013; Pan et al., 
2017). Thus, we believe it is the most relevant cultural dimension for our study. 
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According to the agency theoretic framework, price crash risk arises from the 
information asymmetry between corporate insiders and external stakeholders (Jin and Myers, 
2006). Managers may hoard bad news for various reasons, but their ability to do so is limited. 
Therefore, when the accumulation of bad information passes a certain threshold, it will be 
revealed to the market all at once, leading to a stock price crash. Following Jin and Myers 
(2006), we propose that managers with different cultural values inherited from their ancestors 
may have different attitudes toward exploiting information asymmetries (i.e., withholding 
negative information from shareholders).  
Uncertainty avoidance, which captures a society’s tolerance for uncertainty and 
ambiguity, provides an interesting link to our research question. According to Hofstede et al. 
(2010), individuals with strong uncertainty avoidance will try to control the future and maintain 
rigid codes of belief and behaviour. We expect that executives with strong uncertainty 
avoidance will prefer to avoid future uncertainty and ambiguity for their firms, and will 
therefore be less likely to hoard, and more likely to reveal, up-to-date bad news to the public. 
As a result, we hypothesise that firms whose executives have stronger uncertainty avoidance 
cultural backgrounds will experience lower stock price crash risk.  
To examine our hypothesis, we first use a novel single-country setting, which allows 
us to investigate cross-country cultural impacts without the correlated omitted country-level 
factors, such as economic conditions, dominant religions, legal origins, and governance quality. 
The U.K. market provides an ideal context, because U.K. firms have high proportions of 
foreign executives with diverse nationalities (Conyon et al., 2018), thus enabling us to 
investigate the cultural background of executives directly. Second, we focus on CFOs instead 
of CEOs. This is because CFOs’ duties are primarily financial, and they are responsible for 
reporting accurate and timely financial information (Ham et al., 2017). Kim et al. (2011) argue 
that CFOs have more financial expertise and a greater influence over firms’ financial decisions 
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than CEOs. In addition, examining the impact of CFO cultural background in U.K. firms is 
especially relevant because, in the U.K., CEOs tend to be less powerful than in the U.S. 
(Keenan, 2004; Aguilera et al., 2006).1 CFOs in the U.K. are also more likely to play a more 
significant role in their firms than those in the U.S. (Florackis and Sainani, 2018).2 
We construct a sample of public firms that are constituents of the FTSE All-Share Index 
between 1999 and 2015. This sample is representative, capturing approximately 98% of the 
U.K.’s market capitalisation. We obtain data from three main sources: BoardEx, Datastream, 
and Hofstede’s cultural dimensions. The final sample consists of 703 unique firms, 1,340 
unique CFOs, and 6,531 firm-year observations, and contains 106 unique foreign CFOs (426 
firm-years with non-U.K. CFOs) from 17 countries. 
We present several important findings. First, our main results reveal a negative and 
significant relation between CFO uncertainty avoidance and firm-level stock price crash risk, 
consistent with our expectation that the uncertainty avoidance tendency embedded in CFO 
cultural background affects the risk of future stock price crashes. Our results are robust to 
controlling for CEOs’ and board of directors’ cultural backgrounds as well as addressing 
endogenous concerns using firm fixed effects regression models, a difference-in-differences 
specification, and a propensity score matching procedure. 
Second, in additional analyses, we explore the potential channels of how CFO cultural 
background affects stock price crash risk. Specifically, we find that the effect of CFO 
uncertainty avoidance on crash risk is more pronounced when firms have more severe 
information asymmetry (i.e., lower analyst following, higher bid-ask spreads, lower financial 
                                               
1 Keenan (2004) finds that the same person holds both the chairman and CEO titles in approximately 75% of S&P 
500 companies in the U.S. In contrast, such CEO duality is very rare in U.K. companies. Aguilera et al. (2006) 
highlight that a CEO’s exercise of power may be further constrained according to Higg’s (2003) review. 
2 Florackis and Sainani (2018) find that U.K. CFOs are perceived to play a more important strategic role because 
85% of them sit on the board of directors in their firms, while only 11% of U.S. CFOs hold board positions. 
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statement comparability). This suggests that CFO uncertainty avoidance background may help 
reduce crash risk through decreasing bad news hoarding behaviour (e.g., less opaque financial 
reporting). We also find that the effect of CFO uncertainty avoidance on crash risk is more 
pronounced when firms have higher risk (i.e., higher cash flow volatility, earnings volatility, 
return volatility, and expected default frequency). This suggests that CFO uncertainty 
avoidance background could help reduce crash risk through decreasing potential bad news (e.g., 
less risky investments). 
Third, in robustness tests, we find that the effect of CFO uncertainty avoidance on stock 
price crash risk is particularly important when CFOs have a greater ability to influence firm 
decisions (i.e., older CFOs, and CFOs with higher relative pay). This provides further support 
for the importance of CFO cultural background to firms’ policies and outcomes. Additionally, 
we find that our results hold after controlling for additional factors, including executive 
characteristics (age, tenure, and gender of CEOs and CFOs), financial reporting features 
(earnings management and accounting conservatism), corporate governance characteristics 
(CEO duality, board size, and proportion of independent directors), CFO equity incentives, 
firm internationalisation (percentage of foreign sales and percentage of foreign directors), the 
largest percentage of foreign CFOs (American), and the effect of foreignness (foreign CFO 
indicator). 
This paper provides several important contributions to the extant literature. First, we 
add to the literature on price crash risk by identifying an additional and important determinant: 
CFO cultural background. This area has been underexplored in prior literature. Second, we 
contribute to the literature on executive characteristics and upper echelons theory by 
documenting that executives’ cultural values, especially uncertainty avoidance, affect 
corporate decisions and outcomes. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first paper to 
investigate the relationship between cultural dimension and price crash risk at a firm level. 
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Third, we contribute to the previously overlooked literature on the effect of CFOs by 
documenting their outsize importance in corporate financial decisions and outcomes, even 
beyond that of CEOs. Uhde, Klarner, and Tuschke (2017) note that CFOs play an increasingly 
influential role at the top of firms, but relevant studies remain scarce and fragmented. We 
provide additional evidence about the roles of CEOs and CFOs in the U.K. (Aguilera et al., 
2006; Florackis and Sainani, 2018; Keenan, 2004). Last, we extend previous cross-country 
cultural literature by documenting the managerial cultural effect in a novel single-country 
setting. This enables a better statistical identification of the relation between CFOs’ cultural 
background and stock price crash risk by mitigating the concerns of country-level omitted 
factors. It also highlights a valuable implication that managerial cultural background is relevant 
even for managers working in the same country. Ultimately, our paper shows that CFO cultural 
background is a central and essential factor that should not be neglected in capital markets. 
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows: Section 2 provides an overview of 
the relevant literature and presents our hypothesis. Section 3 discusses our data and 
methodology, while section 4 presents the empirical results. Section 5 concludes. 
 
2. Literature and hypothesis development 
2.1. Price crash risk 
The mechanism of corporate stock price crash risk is based on the argument that 
managers tend to hoard negative information over an extended period, allowing it to 
accumulate. If managers withhold negative information successfully, the distribution of stock 
returns should be more negatively skewed (Callen and Fang, 2015; Chen et al., 2001; Hutton 
et al., 2009). However, when the stockpile of negative news reaches a certain threshold, it is 
released to the market all at once, leading to a sharp price decrease. The agency theoretic 
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framework proposed by Jin and Myers (2006) suggests that crash risk can be caused by the 
existence of information asymmetries between corporate insiders and external stakeholders.  
Several streams of literature have investigated the potential determinants of crash risk 
(Habib et al., 2018). First, specific signals from capital markets, such as trading volume as 
investigated in Chen et al. (2001), and stock liquidity as examined in Chang et al. (2017), can 
predict future crash risk.  
Second, crash risk is found to be closely related to the quality of the corporate 
governance mechanism. For example, Andreou et al. (2016) find that ownership structure, 
accounting opacity, board structure, and managerial incentives can explain price crash risk. 
Empirical studies also find that analyst coverage affects firm-specific crash risk (Xu et al., 2013; 
Xu et al., 2017).  
Third, informal institutional mechanisms can explain future crash risk. Lee and Wang 
(2017) find that political connections of directors affect stock price crash risk in China. Callen 
and Fang (2015) document that religion affects crash risk when looking at firms headquartered 
in different U.S. counties. 
Fourth, prior studies suggest that managers’ idiosyncratic characteristics may shape 
their decisions on withholding bad news. For example, Kim et al. (2016b) show that CEO 
overconfidence is an important factor in future crash risk because overconfident CEOs are more 
likely to overestimate future cash flows and undertake negative net present value projects. 
Andreou et al. (2017) document a negative relationship between CEO age and stock price crash 
risk. They posit that CEOs have greater financial incentives to hoard bad news in their earlier 
careers. This stream of the literature is more closely related to our setting for investigating the 
determinants of stock price crash risk.  
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2.2. Chief financial officers (CFOs) 
A seminal study in business and management by Dearborn and Simon (1958) 
recognises the importance of top managers to firms’ value-generating activities. It concludes 
that managers exhibit comprehensive differences in attitudes, knowledge, and perspectives, 
stemming mainly from differences in their functional backgrounds, which can lead to widely 
varying strategic decisions. Hambrick and Mason (1984), building on Dearborn and Simon’s 
(1958) work, develop the upper echelons theory, which states that the top management team’s 
background characteristics are key predictors of organisational behaviours and outcomes. 
Decision-making in organisations is complicated by uncertainty, ambiguity, and competing 
goals. Top managers will use their cognitive biases and values to filter information, assess 
situations, and make strategic decisions. Bertrand and Schoar (2003) further document that top 
managers have statistically and economically significant effects on corporate decisions. 
However, empirical studies thus far have focused primarily on the effect of CEOs, with 
the implicit assumption that power and key decision-making authority are concentrated in their 
hands (Herrmann and Datta, 2002). There has been only limited research into whether and how 
CFOs influence corporate decisions, although that has begun to change, with some recent 
studies recognising the vital role of CFOs. Ham et al. (2017), for example, note that CFOs are 
responsible for the accuracy and timeliness of firm financial disclosures, and therefore have 
the greatest share of firm financial duties. Ge et al. (2011) find that CFO fixed effects can 
explain a range of accounting practices, such as operating lease classifications, discretionary 
accruals, and earnings smoothing. More importantly, they find little evidence linking CFO 
fixed effects to standard demographic characteristics, such as gender, age, or education, and 
conclude it is likely that more subtle personality attributes are at play.  
These two studies are closely tied to our research question, because the influence of 
CFO personality on accurate and timely information disclosures leads to variations in firms’ 
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stock price crash risk. Therefore, our study complements both Ham et al. (2017) and Ge et al. 
(2011) by highlighting CFO cultural background as one of the subtle but important personal 
features that affect CFO financial decisions. 
2.3. Cultural characteristics 
An emerging literature has documented the significant influence of culture on corporate 
decisions and outcomes, such as analysts’ forecasting accuracy, information disclosures and 
corresponding market responses, and firm performance under pressure. Du et al. (2017) use 
individual ethnicity as a proxy for culture. They find supportive evidence for the effect of 
cultural proximity on information asymmetry in financial markets, which highlights its 
importance as a component of human capital. Brochet et al. (2018) show that managers’ ethnic 
backgrounds can affect how they communicate with investors and how the market responds to 
the disclosure event. Furthermore, Nguyen et al. (2018) present evidence that CEOs’ cultural 
heritage affects U.S. bank performance under competitive pressure. They attribute the effect to 
the wide variety of cultural values that represent a CEO’s ancestral country of origin.  
Liu (2015) documents that CEO cultural origin is an economically important 
determinant of CEO incentives, which dominates other CEO-specific factors such as birth year, 
gender, education, MBA degree, selective college, and military experience. This indicates that 
managerial cultural background is a key feature with an incremental effect that is above and 
beyond other managerial characteristics. 
Prior literature has also analysed the role of uncertainty avoidance in business. Kwok 
and Tadesse (2006) test how uncertainty avoidance affects individuals’ investment preferences. 
Using cross-country analysis, they find that countries with stronger uncertainty avoidance tend 
to have a more risk-averse market-based financial system. Kanagaretnam et al. (2014) find that 
uncertainty avoidance affects accounting conservatism and risk-taking in the banking industry. 
Specifically, banks in countries with stronger uncertainty avoidance tend to be less risk-taking, 
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and more conservative in their earnings reports. Using a firm-level analysis, Pan et al. (2017) 
find that CEOs with stronger uncertainty avoidance are less likely to undertake acquisitions 
and R&D investments. Given the important influence of culture, especially uncertainty 
avoidance, in financial markets, it is worth examining whether this aspect of executives affects 
crash risk.  
Hofstede’s cultural dimensions have been widely used in multi-country cultural studies, 
but, in this paper, we examine a single-country setting. We thus avoid the problem of correlated 
omitted variables, such as economic conditions, dominant religions, legal origins, and 
governance quality. Previous literature (Conyon et al., 2018) has found that U.K. firms have 
higher proportions of foreign executives with more diverse nationalities than firms in other 
countries such as the U.S. Accordingly, we choose to focus on U.K. firms, and conduct our 
analyses of the cultural background of foreign executives directly at a firm level. 
Following Kanagaretnam et al. (2014) and Pan et al. (2017), we measure uncertainty 
avoidance using Hofstede et al.’s (2010) UAI, which captures a society’s tolerance for 
uncertainty and ambiguity. That is, individuals with a strong UAI will try to control the future 
and maintain more rigid codes of belief and behaviour. CFOs with a strong UAI may prefer to 
avoid future uncertainty and ambiguity for their firms. A stronger UAI would also reflect a 
society with stronger formalised rules and established group norms for the purpose of ensuring 
stability, resulting in less room for individual discretion (Mahajan and Toh, 2017; Randolph 
and Sashkin, 2002).  
Nadler and Breuer (2017) further suggest that a culture of uncertainty avoidance may 
affect individual risk preference (e.g., Hens and Wang, 2007) or ambiguity preference (e.g., 
Chui and Kwok, 2008), or perhaps both. In other words, CFOs with stronger UAI may be more 
risk averse, so they may follow more conservative corporate policies with less risky projects. 
They may also be more ambiguity averse, and therefore more willing to reveal, and less likely 
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to hoard, up-to-date bad news. Both of these effects could lead to lower stock price crash risk. 
Thus, our hypothesis is as follows: 
Hypothesis 1: Firms with CFOs who have stronger UAI will experience lower price crash risk. 
 
3. Data and variables 
3.1. Data 
Our data come from three main sources. Executive characteristics and corporate 
governance variables are obtained from BoardEx (any missing executive nationality is 
manually collected from FAME). Firm-level data, including return index, firm revenues, and 
accounting data, are derived from Datastream. UAI is obtained from Hofstede et al. (2010). 
The sample consists of the constituents of the FTSE All-Share Index during the 1999-
2015 period. This index captures 98% of the U.K.’s market capitalisation, and is comprised of 
all the constituents of the FTSE 100, the FTSE 250, and the FTSE Small Cap Indexes. We 
collect the return index on these firms from Datastream, and calculate weekly stock returns for 
all individual firms. We follow Ince and Porter (2006) and An et al. (2018) in screening and 
correcting the return index. In particular, we set a return index as missing if it is less than 0.01, 
and we exclude the observation if the return index exceeds 200% and reverses in one week. 
We truncate the absolute value of unusually high weekly returns at 0.5.  
We then filter the sample by: 1) winsorising the firm-level variables at the 1st and 99th 
percentiles in order to eliminate potential outlier effects, and 2) excluding any firms with less 
than 26 weekly observations in a given year. The final sample consists of 703 firms, 1,340 
CFOs, and 6,351 firm-years, and contains 106 unique foreign CFOs (426 firm-years with non-
U.K. CFOs) from 17 countries. Table 1 shows that the CFOs with the strongest and weakest 
UAI are from France (0.86) and Singapore (0.08), respectively.  
[Insert Table 1 here] 
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3.2. Model specification 
To investigate whether CFO UAI affects future stock price crash risk, we use the 
following pooled OLS regression model in our empirical analyses:3 
!"#$%_"'$(),+ = - + / × !12_3#'),+45 +678 × !29:"2;),+458<8=5 + >),+ (1)	
where !"#$%_"'$( is measured by the variables !239:, 9!$(CD, and E3F2;, which 
we elaborate on in the next subsection. !12_3#' is determined by the nationality of the CFO. 
Following prior literature, !29:"2;  includes control variables on investor belief 
heterogeneity, stock historical performance, and firm characteristics. Definitions of the main 
variables are in Appendix A. A set of year time dummies is included to capture the effects of 
macroeconomic shocks, and a set of industry dummies is included to capture interindustry 
differences in the demand for executive talent. In addition, we apply lead-lag regressions to 
reduce issues related to reverse causality. 
3.3. Stock price crash risk 
To measure stock price crash risk, we follow Hutton et al. (2009) and Kim et al. (2011). 
We use weekly returns within one fiscal year for each firm to estimate firm-specific weekly 
returns. First, we estimate the following regression model: G),+ = -) + /5)GH,+4I + /I)GH,+45 + /J)GH,+ + /K)GH,+L5 + /M)GH,+LI + N)+ (2) 
where G),+ is the return on an individual stock P in week Q, and GH,+ is the return on the FTSE 
All-Share Index in week Q. Lead and lag returns for the market are included to allow for non-
                                               
3 We also test for the likelihood of a quadratic relation between CFO UAI and crash risk by simultaneously 
including !12_3#' and its square in the same regression. Corresponding results are shown in Table A1 in the 
Online Appendix. From these results, we find no evidence of a quadratic relation, since both the coefficient on !12_3#' and the coefficient on its square are statistically insignificant. It is thus more likely that !12_3#' will 
linearly affect stock price crash risk, but unlikely that a CFO will have a retroactive influence on crash risk due to 
having a cultural background that overemphasises UAI. 
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synchronous trading (Dimson, 1979). The residual term from the above regression model is 
used to calculate firm-specific weekly returns (D)+): D),+ = ln	(1 + N),+) (3) 
We use three measures to proxy for stock price crash risk. The first, !239:, is based 
on the number of firm-specific weekly returns exceeding 3.20 standard deviations above and 
below the mean firm-specific weekly return over the fiscal year, taking the downside minus 
the upside frequencies. 
The second, 9!$(CD, is the negative skewness of firm-specific weekly returns, and 
is calculated by dividing the negative of the third moment of the firm-specific weekly returns 
in a fiscal year by the standard deviation of those returns raised to the third power: 
9!$(CD = − 9(9 − 1)JI ∑D),+J(9 − 1)(9 − 2)W∑D),+I XJI (4) 
where 9 is the number of firm-specific weekly returns of firm P in a fiscal year. 
The third, E3F2;, measures the down-to-up volatility of firm-specific weekly returns 
by dividing all the weeks in a fiscal year into two groups: down-weeks with firm-specific 
weekly returns below the annual mean, and up-weeks with firm-specific weekly returns above 
the annual mean. E3F2; is then calculated as the natural logarithm of the ratio of the standard 
deviation of firm-specific weekly returns in down-weeks to that in up-weeks, as follows: 
E3F2; = lnZ(9[ − 1)∑D)\,+I(9] − 1)∑D)^,+I _ (5) 
where D)\,+/D)^,+ is firm P’s firm-specific weekly return in a down-/up-week, and 9]/9[ is 
the number of down-/up-weeks in a fiscal year. 
All three proxies provide indications of the asymmetry of firm-specific weekly returns. 
Higher values of !239:, 9!$(CD, and E3F2; indicate higher levels of crash risk. 
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3.4. CFO uncertainty avoidance background 
To measure CFO uncertainty avoidance background, we follow prior literature (e.g., 
Kanagaretnam et al., 2014), and use the uncertainty avoidance index from Hofstede’s cultural 
dimensions to assign scores based on CFO nationality. As we noted earlier, we obtain CFO 
nationality data from BoardEx, and we manually collect any missing data from FAME. 
One caveat is that our empirical measure of CFO cultural background depends on 
nationality, which is prone to measurement error. For example, CFO nationality may differ 
from CFO birth country. We therefore test the validity of our measure by comparing our 
nationality measure to the manually collected CFO birthplace information from “Ancestry.com” 
for a subsample of FTSE 350 firms across our sample period. We are able to find the birthplace 
for 68% of CFOs for FTSE 350 firms. Among these, only 3% had a different nationality from 
birth country, indicating that our nationality measure is largely accurate. Using birthplace leads 
to a huge loss in available observations, but CFO nationality matches birthplace in most cases. 
Therefore, we believe the nationality measure is the best available measure to capture CFO 
cultural background.  
3.5. Control variables 
Following prior research on price crash risk (Andreou et al., 2016; Chen et al., 2001; 
DeFond et al., 2015; Hutton et al., 2009; Kim et al., 2011; Kim et al., 2016a), we include the 
following control variables in regression models. To control for investor belief heterogeneity, 
we include the detrended stock trading volume (b:3"9) to measure difference of opinion 
among investors. To control for the potential persistence of the third moment of stock returns, 
and address concerns about dynamic endogeneity, we use the lag value of the negative 
skewness of past firm-specific stock returns (9!$(CD). Given that stocks with higher past 
returns and higher volatilities have a higher potential of experiencing crashes, we include the 
average and the standard deviation of firm-specific weekly returns ("C: and $:E_"C:) over 
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the previous year in the regression. We also control for various firm fundamental characteristics: 
firm size ($'cC), which is the natural logarithm of a firm’s market capitalisation; market-to-
book ratio (d:e); financial leverage (;CF), which is the ratio of long-term debt to total assets; 
and return on assets ("2#). 
 
4. Empirical results 
4.1. Descriptive summary 
Table 2, panel A, presents the descriptive statistics of the main variables in our study. 
The mean values of !239: , 9!$(CD , and E3F2;  are −0.049, −0.048, and −0.057, 
respectively, which are similar to those found in prior price crash risk studies (e.g., Chen et al., 
2017). The firm-level characteristics are also consistent with those in prior studies based on the 
U.K. market (e.g., Conyon et al., 2018).  
[Insert Table 2 here] 
Table 2, panel B, shows the correlation matrix. All three proxies of price crash risk are 
highly positively correlated, confirming that they are able to capture the most common aspects.  
Figure 1 presents the initial evidence for how different proxies of price crash risk 
change around the CFO turnover event. Panel A shows that, if the incoming CFO has a stronger 
UAI than the incumbent CFO, crash risk will generally decrease after the turnover. Consistently, 
panel B shows that a firm will suffer higher crash risk if the incoming CFO has a weaker UAI 
than the incumbent CFO. Both panels indicate that stronger CFO UAI is associated with lower 
price crash risk, supporting our hypothesis. In the next subsection, we investigate how CFO 
UAI affects future stock price crash risk through regression models. 
[Insert Figure 1 here] 
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4.2. Main results 
Table 3 presents the OLS regression results of stock price crash risk on CFO UAI. We 
use !239:, 9!$(CD, and E3F2; as dependent variables in columns (1) to (3), respectively. 
The results reveal that stronger !12_3#' is associated with lower future stock price crash 
risk.4  
To elaborate, in model 1, the coefficient on !12_3#' is −0.329, with a t-statistic of 
−2.51. With respect to economic significance, the effect of a one standard deviation (0.049) 
increase in !12_3#' leads to a 0.329 × 0.049 = 0.016 decrease in !239:. In model 2, the 
coefficient on !12_3#'  is −0.504 with a t-statistic of −2.85, indicating that, on average, 
increasing !12_3#' by one standard deviation (0.049) will decrease 9!$(CD by 0.504 ×0.049 = 0.024. In model 3, the coefficient on !12_3#' is −0.350 with a t-statistic of −3.12. 
This indicates that a one standard deviation increase in !12_3#'  leads to a decrease in E3F2; of 0.350 × 0.049 = 0.017. Taken together, firms with CFOs who have stronger UAI 
experience lower crash risk in the following year, which is consistent with our hypothesis. 
[Insert Table 3 here] 
4.3. CEOs’ and board of directors’ cultural backgrounds 
Thus far, our empirical results confirm that CFOs play an important role in corporate 
decisions and outcomes. However, previous literature has suggested that CEO characteristics 
significantly influence price crash risk. For example, Kim et al. (2016b) note that overconfident 
CEOs positively affect stock price crash risk. Andreou et al. (2017) find that CEO age is 
negatively related to future price crash risk. In addition, we consider the board of directors’ 
cultural backgrounds, because previous literature has shown that board characteristics can 
affect firm outcomes (e.g., Erhardt et al., 2003; Haniffa and Cooke, 2005; Walt and Ingley, 
                                               
4 Results are qualitatively consistent if we focus instead on a small sample of firms with only non-U.K. CFOs 
(426 year-firm observations). 
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2003). Therefore, it is crucial to investigate whether the cultural background of CEOs or the 
board has a similar impact, and whether the effect of CFOs’ uncertainty avoidance tendency is 
incremental to that of CEOs and boards.  
Columns (1) to (3) of Table 4 present our regression results by including !12_3#', !C2_3#', and e2#"E_3#' in the same regression model.5 The results reveal that the effect 
of !12_3#' on different measures of stock price crash risk remains significant (at least at a 5% 
level) after taking !C2_3#'  and e2#"E_3#'  into consideration. We fail to find any 
significant relation between !C2_3#' and stock price crash risk, and we only detect a marginal 
relation between e2#"E_3#' and stock price crash risk (significant at a 10% level only in 
column (3)). Overall, !12_3#'  dominates !C2_3#'  and e2#"E_3#'  in affecting stock 
price crash risk. The insignificant influence of CEOs on financial outcomes in U.K. firms may 
be attributable to the fact that they tend to be less powerful in U.K. than in U.S. firms (Keenan, 
2004; Aguilera et al., 2006). Furthermore, the finding that CFOs play a more important role 
than CEOs in finance-related decisions is consistent with Kim et al. (2011) and Florackis and 
Sainani (2018). 
[Insert Table 4 here] 
4.4. Endogeneity 
While the OLS regression assumes that the presence of a CFO with a specific cultural 
background is exogenous, we are concerned that it may be endogenous and influenced by the 
omission of relevant variables or a selection bias. For example, a CFO with a stronger UAI 
may be attractive to various firms. To address this concern, we first employ firm-fixed effects. 
                                               
5 Our main results hold even if we also control for: 1) the UAI difference between CFO and CEO, as well as 
between CFO and the board, which is defined as the absolute difference between their UAI scores; 2) the cultural 
background distance between CFO and CEO, as well as between CFO and the board, which is defined following 
Aybar and Ficici’s (2009) method. Specifically, we first calculate the absolute difference between CFO and the 
CEO/board for four cultural dimensions (uncertainty avoidance, power distance, individualism, and masculinity). 
We then calculate the average ranking of each dimension divided by the number of observations in order to capture 
culture distance. Regression results are presented in Table A2 in the Online Appendix. 
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The application of firm-fixed effects controls to some extent for any unobserved, time-invariant 
firm-specific factors. It also allows us to test our first hypothesis via within-firm variation, e.g., 
when firms experience a CFO turnover between individuals with different uncertainty 
avoidance tendencies. The results are in Table 5, panel A, and suggest that the effect of !12_3#' on price crash risk remains significant after controlling for firm-fixed effects.6 
[Insert Table 5 here] 
Second, we employ a difference-in-differences (DID) specification that uses a CFO 
turnover event. Specifically, we compare firms that are influenced by turnover events with a 
change in CFO UAI (the treatment group) with those without such changes (the control group). 
We then examine the effect of CFO turnover events. In addition, since we investigate how 
crash risk changes from the periods before CFO turnover to the periods afterward, we are able 
to control for time-invariant unobservable firm effects. Hence, we can rule out alternative 
explanations if no other change, independent of the CFO turnover, occurred within the firm at 
the same time. Note that, although the DID specification enjoys the above identification 
advantages, some limitations remain, such as a lower number of observations (i.e., only 
turnover-related firm-years are included), and a lower variation in our variable of interest (i.e., 
we convert our continuous !12_3#' variable into dummy variables that capture whether an 
incoming CFO has stronger or weaker UAI). The DID and firm-fixed effects model therefore 
complement each other.  
Following Huang and Kisgen (2013), we then reconstruct our sample and turnover 
indicators to mitigate any potential measurement errors. First, we limit our sample to the three 
years before and after a CFO turnover, excluding the transition year. Second, we require firm 
have at least two years’ of available data before the CFO turnover. Third, we require that a new 
                                               
6 It is possible that CFOs may be “sticky” to firms. In such cases, the firm-fixed effects will absorb the time-
invariant CFO-level characteristics. Hence, CFO stickiness will not affect our inferences, because we still find 
significant results. 
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CFO be in power for at least two years after the turnover year. The final sample consists of 614 
turnovers, of which 33 involved an incumbent CFO being replaced by a new CFO with a 
stronger UAI, and 20 involved being replaced by a new CFO with a weaker UAI. Our 
difference-in-differences regression model is: !"#$%_"'$(),+ = - + /k × l2$:),+ + /5 × l2$:),+ × !12_E2D9),++/I × l2$:),+ × !12_3l),+ +678 × !29:"2;),+458<8=5 + >),+ (6) 
where l2$:),+ is an indicator that equals 1 if the observation is a post-turnover event, and 0 
otherwise, !12_E2D9),+ equals 1 if an incoming CFO has a weaker UAI, and 0 otherwise, 
and !12_3l),+ equals 1 if an incoming CFO has a stronger UAI, and 0 otherwise. We also 
control for firm- and year-fixed effects.  
Table 5, panel B, presents corresponding results. We find that the coefficients of the 
interaction term l2$:),+ × !12_E2D9),+  are positively but insignificantly associated with 
crash risk, while the coefficients of l2$:),+ × !12_3l),+  are negatively and significantly 
associated with crash risk. This indicates that a new CEO with a stronger UAI will reduce firm 
stock price crash risk. The results are, in general, consistent with our main inferences. 
Finally, we complement the above two tests by using the propensity score matching 
approach. The purpose is to match a set of control firms (firms that retain CFOs with median 
to low UAI) to a set of treatment firms (firms that retain CFOs with above-median UAI), so 
that the two sets are statistically alike in terms of other relevant factors. The propensity method 
therefore allows us to identify the treatment effect on firms. We capture the treatment firms by 
using an indicator variable (i.e.,	%!12_3#') that equals 1 if the firms retain CFOs with above-
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industry median UAIs, and 0 otherwise. Because most of the CFOs are British, median UAI is 
the British UAI,7 and we only identify 268 firm-years as treated firms.8 
Propensity score matching proceeds in two steps. In the first step, we estimate a logit 
model to determine the propensity score. The covariates used to predict the probability of 
treated firms (%!12_3#') are consistent with the control variables used in the baseline results 
in Table 3. An untabulated logit regression suggests that most of the firm-level covariates 
predict the probability of treated firms (i.e., $:E_"C:, "C:,	∆:3"9, $'cC, d/e, ;CF). This 
finding confirms that the presence of CFOs with strong UAI is endogenous to these observable 
covariates.9  
In the second step, we match firms by using a nearest neighbour algorithm with caliper 
0.01 and no replacement, and we restrict the observations to only those within the common 
support. We identify 256 pairs in total. We then re-estimate our baseline regression model using 
a paired sample. The sample variation dramatically decreases because of both the limited 
observations of CFOs with above-median UAI, and the transformation of UAI from continuous 
values (ranging from 0.08 for Singapore to 0.86 for France) to an indicator value (0 and 1). 
Nevertheless, Table 5, panel C, reveals a marginally significant and negative relation between 
CFO UAI and !239: and 9!$(CD. 
Collectively, the results from firm-fixed effects regressions, the difference-in-
differences specification, and propensity score matching estimators are consistent with our 
baseline results. Therefore, the negative effect of !12_3#' on future stock price crash risk is 
robust after controlling for correlated omitted variables and selection bias. 
                                               
7  Because of the cross-industry heterogeneity, we apply an industry median as a benchmark to determine %!12_3#'. Untabulated results show our results remain robust if we use the sample median instead. 
8 The treatment firms are those with CFOs from Australia, Brazil, Canada, Netherlands, France, Germany, India, 
Israel, Italy, Malaysia, New Zealand, Norway, South Africa, Switzerland, and the U.S. 
9 Due to space limitations, we do not report the logit regression for the first step of the propensity score matching 
approach. However, the results are available upon request. 
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4.5. Additional analyses 
In this section, we explore the potential channels through which CFO uncertainty 
avoidance background affects future stock price crash risk. 
4.5.1. The effect of information asymmetry 
First, we investigate whether the negative relationship between CFO uncertainty 
avoidance and future stock price crash risk is affected by the level of a firm’s asymmetric 
information. The agency theoretic framework suggests that crash risk results from managerial 
bad news hoarding behaviours (Jin and Myers, 2006; Hutton et al., 2009). The uncertainty 
avoidance culture influences individuals’ ambiguity preferences (Chui and Kwok, 2008). 
Given these notions, we expect that managers’ abilities and incentives to hoard bad news will 
be stronger in firms with higher information asymmetry.  
Empirically, we divide our sample into two groups based on four different measures to 
gauge the level of information asymmetry. First, we use number of analysts following, #nopqrQ	stuvGowv, as a proxy for the strength of a firm’s external monitoring. A higher 
number of analysts following indicates stronger external monitoring. Yu (2008) documents that 
firms with higher levels of analyst following tend to engage in less opportunistic earnings 
management, indicating that managerial discretionary behaviour is constrained by stronger 
external monitoring. Accordingly, we expect that the negative effect of CFO UAI on price 
crash risk will be stronger for firms with a weaker external monitoring environment. The 
subsample results are in Table 6, panel A. We find that the negative effect of CFO UAI is more 
significant for firms with a lower number of analysts following, consistent with our expectation. 
[Insert Table 6 here] 
Second, we use bid-ask spreads as a proxy for the quality of a firm’s information 
environment. ePx − ory	rzGvox is the annual average spread calculated using the daily ratio 
of the difference between the ask and bid prices to the midpoint of the ask and bid prices. A 
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higher bid-ask spread indicates a lower level of information environment quality. Jayaraman 
(2008) suggests that higher bid-ask spreads could be due to higher levels of informed trading. 
We expect that the effect of CFO UAI will be stronger for firms with lower levels of 
information environment quality. The results are in Table 6, panel B. We find that the negative 
effect of CFO UAI on price crash risk is stronger for firms with higher bid-ask spreads, 
consistent with our expectation. 
Third, we use financial statement comparability as a proxy for the quantity and quality 
of a firm’s information. 1PnonsPop	rQoQv{vnQ	st{zoGo|PpPQq  denotes firm-level 
comparability as developed by De Franco et al. (2011). It is calculated as the average of the 
four highest comparability scores for all P-} firm pairs in the same industry during period Q.10 
Prior literature suggests that comparability lowers the cost of acquiring and processing 
information and enhances the quality of information available to investors (De Franco et al., 
2011; Kim et al., 2016a). We expect the effect of CFO UAI to be stronger when firms’ financial 
statements are less comparable. The results are in Table 6, panel C. We find that the effect of 
CFO UAI is more pronounced for firms with lower financial statement comparability, 
consistent with our expectation.  
Overall, the results in Table 6 are consistent with our expectation that the effect of CFO 
UAI is stronger among firms with a higher level of information asymmetry.  
4.5.2. The effect of firm risk 
Second, we investigate whether the negative association between CFO uncertainty 
avoidance and future stock price crash risk is affected by the riskiness of the firm. Prior 
literature argues that the culture of uncertainty avoidance influences individual risk preferences. 
                                               
10 Untabulated results show that our inferences are robust to an alternative financial statement comparability 
measurement, which is calculated as the median of the comparability scores for all P-} firm pairs in the same 
industry during period Q. 
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That is, CFOs with stronger UAI may be more risk averse and follow more conservative 
corporate policies with less risky projects, resulting in less bad news to hoard. Accordingly, we 
expect that managers’ risk aversion due to a strong uncertainty avoidance background will be 
stronger in firms with more risk-taking activities (i.e., riskier firms).  
Empirically, we divide our sample into two groups based on four measures to proxy for 
firm riskiness: !orℎ	ptÄ	utpoQPpPQq is the standard deviation of quarterly cash flows from 
operations over the sixteen quarters scaled by total debt (Graham et al., 2008); voGnPnwr	utpoQPpPQq is the standard deviation of the past eight earnings changes scaled by the 
average book asset over the past eight quarters (Valta, 2012); GvQÅGn	utpoQPpPQq is annualised 
volatility calculated using monthly stock returns from the previous year (Bharath and Shumway, 
2008; Brogaard et al., 2017); and vÇzvsQvx	xvoÅpQ	GvÉÅvnsq is the probability that the 
value of a firm’s assets will be less than the face value of its debt (Bharath and Shumway, 2008; 
Brogaard et al., 2017).  
The results are in Table 7, panels A-D. We find strong evidence that the effect of CFO 
UAI is more pronounced for firms with higher levels of cash flow volatility, earnings volatility, 
return volatility, and expected default frequency. Collectively, the results in Table 7 are 
consistent with our expectation that the effect of CFO UAI is stronger for firms with higher 
levels of riskiness. 
[Insert Table 7 here] 
4.6. Robustness Tests 
4.6.1. The effect of CFO influence 
In this subsection, to further confirm the important role of CFO cultural background in 
affecting corporate decision and outcomes, we explore whether the negative association 
between CFO uncertainty avoidance and future stock price crash risk is affected by the level 
of influence of CFOs on firm decision-making. The underlying premise is that executives can 
24 
 
only affect firm outcomes when they have a solid influence on firm decisions (Adams et al., 
2005). Specifically, we test two measurements of CFOs’ ability to influence firm decisions: 
CFO seniority, and CFO relative pay.  
First, we examine whether the effect of CFO UAI on price crash risk is subject to CFO 
seniority. In order to affect a firm’s financial strategy and financial information disclosure, 
CFOs must have sufficient capabilities, experiences, and confidence. Professional skills 
accumulate over time, and these skills are more likely to be better developed in senior CFOs 
(Florackis and Sainani, 2018). In other words, CFO seniority is closely related to CFOs’ level 
of professional skills, and it also captures how a CFO can affect a firm’s financial strategy and 
information disclosure. Therefore, we expect that the effect of CFO UAI will be stronger when 
CFOs are more senior.  
We separate our sample into two subsamples based on CFO age, and test how CFO 
seniority interacts with CFO UAI. The results are in Table 8, panel A. We find that the 
coefficients on CFO UAI on price crash risk are significant, with higher economic magnitude, 
only in firms with more senior CFOs. This is consistent with our expectation. 
[Insert Table 8 here] 
Second, we examine whether the effect of CFO UAI on price crash risk is subject to 
CFO relative pay. As suggested in Finkelstein (1992), a manager’s compensation is an 
important measure of influence within a firm. Thus, more highly paid CFOs are expected to 
have a more significant effect on corporate decisions. To capture the potential influence of a 
CFO on corporate financial strategy, we use CFO relative pay, which is defined as the ratio of 
the CFO’s total compensation, excluding equity-based awards, to the CEO’s total 
compensation. If CFO relative pay is higher, we expect that the CFO uncertainty avoidance 
tendency will be more likely to influence a firm’s financial reporting decisions, and, therefore, 
the stock price crash risk.  
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We divide our sample into two groups based on CFO relative pay. The results are in 
Table 8, panel B. We find that the negative effect of CFO UAI on price crash risk is stronger 
when CFO relative pay is higher, especially for !239: and 9!$(CD, which is consistent 
with our expectation. Taken together, the above analyses indicate that the effect of CFO UAI 
on stock price crash risk is particularly important when CFOs are likely to have a greater 
influence on firm decisions. 
4.6.2. Additional controls 
At last, to further ensure robustness, we re-estimate our main regression models with a 
full set of control variables, and then control for additional factors.11 First, we consider other 
executive characteristics, including age, tenure, and gender of CEOs and CFOs. Andreou et al. 
(2017) document that firms with younger CEOs are more likely to experience stock price crash 
risk, since CEOs have more incentives to hoard bad news in their earlier careers. The relevant 
results are presented in Table 9, panel A.  
[Insert Table 9 here] 
Second, we consider financial reporting quality. Hutton et al. (2009) find that the 
transparency of financial statements affects stock price crashes. This is because higher financial 
reporting quality can help reduce information asymmetry. Specifically, they find a non-linear 
effect of financial reporting opacity on crash risk. Kim and Zhang (2016) also document that 
conditional conservatism can reduce managers’ incentives and ability to hide bad news. It is 
therefore associated with a lower crash risk. Thus, we control for accounting quality by 
including 2l#Ñ3C and its square, as well as a conservatism score, in addition to our main 
results.12 The relevant results are in Table 9, panel B. 
                                               
11 The number of sample observations varies depending on the data availability of additional controls. 
12 Our primary measure for opacity captures performance-adjusted discretionary accruals, as developed by Kothari 
et al. (2005). Our results are not sensitive if we measure discretionary accruals with a modified Jones model 
(Dechow et al., 1995) (as shown in Table A3 in the Online Appendix). 
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Third, we consider corporate governance characteristics. Higher corporate governance 
quality reflects more effective monitoring over executives. Because high governance quality 
may prevent executives from hoarding bad news, it leads to a limited effect of CFOs on future 
crash risk. Therefore, we investigate whether corporate governance quality affects the influence 
of CFO UAI on stock price crash risk. We use three proxies for corporate governance 
characteristics: board size, CEO-chairman duality, and non-executive director ratio (i.e., 
proportion of independent directors). The relevant results are in Table 9, panel C.  
Fourth, we consider CFO equity incentives. Equity incentives may induce managerial 
short-termism, such as bad news hoarding, by inflating short-term stock prices (Bolton et al., 
2006; Benmelech et al., 2010). Kim et al. (2011) find that executives’ (especially CFOs’) equity 
incentives significantly affect crash risk. Therefore, we control for CFO equity incentives, 
which are measured as the ratio of equity-based incentives over total compensation.13 The 
relevant results are in Table 9, panel D. 
Fifth, we consider Hofstede’s other cultural dimensions, besides uncertainty avoidance. 
These include power distance, lE'  (the extent to which less powerful members of 
organisations and institutions accept and expect power to be distributed unequally), 
individualism, 'EF  (the extent to which people feel independent, as opposed to being 
interdependent members of larger wholes), and masculinity, d#$ (the extent to which the use 
of force is endorsed socially). Previous literature finds that other cultural dimensions, 
especially individualism, are also pertinent for information disclosure and financial outcomes. 
For example, Kanagaretnam et al. (2014) find that individualism is negatively related to 
accounting conservatism, and positively related to risk-taking in the banking industry. An et al. 
(2018) and Dang et al. (2018) find that firms located in countries with higher levels of 
                                               
13 We also consider an alternative CFO equity incentives measurement: the natural logarithm of equity-based 
compensation. Corresponding results are presented in Table A4 in the Online Appendix, and show that our 
inferences are robust to this alternative measure. 
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individualism have higher stock price crash risk. Jakob and Nam (2017) show that higher 
masculinity and individualism are significantly associated with less negative abnormal market 
reactions prior to official sovereign debt rating downgrade announcements. The relevant results 
are in Table 9, panel E.14 
Sixth, we consider firm-level internationalisation. As it increases, the level of 
complexity and monitoring difficulty also increase. This leads to higher asymmetric 
information and agency problems. Boehme and May (2016) find that multinational firms are 
more likely to crash. Hence, we include two proxies for firm internationalisation: percentage 
of foreign sales, and percentage of foreign directors.15 The relevant results are in Table 9, panel 
F. 
Seventh, we consider whether our finding on the effect of CFO UAI is driven by a 
specific group of CFOs. Table 1 shows that U.S. CFOs make up the third-highest proportion, 
after U.K. and Irish CFOs. We therefore test whether our results hold by including a dummy 
variable, !12_3$#, which equals 1 if a CFO’s nationality is American, and 0 otherwise. The 
results are in Table 9, panel G. 
Last, we consider the effect of foreignness. One could argue that the CFO effect is due 
purely to foreignness rather than to cultural background. We therefore test whether our results 
hold when we include a dummy variable that equals 1 if a CFO is not British, and 0 otherwise. 
The relevant results are in Table 9, panel H.  
                                               
14 We note that !12_3#' is highly correlated with !12_lE' (0.662), !12_'EF (-0.394), and !12_d#$	(-0.588) 
(as shown in Table A5 in the Online Appendix). High correlations may cause multicollinearity in our analysis. 
We therefore test the variance inflation factors (VIFs) of these cultural dimensions to check for multicollinearity. 
The VIFs are low, and below the threshold of 10 (Hair et al., 2009), indicating that multicollinearity is unlikely to 
be a major concern in our regressions. In addition, we orthogonalize !12_3#' by regressing !12_3#' on the 
other cultural dimensions (i.e., !12_lE' , !12_'EF , !12_d#$ ) and taking the residual (!12_3#'_"C ). !12_3#'_"C captures the component of UAI that cannot be explained by the other Hofstede cultural dimensions. 
We re-estimate our baseline modules and find that our main inferences hold. Details for corresponding results are 
shown in Table A6 in the Online Appendix. 
15 Our results are also robust when using alternative measures of firm internationalisation, including percentage 
of foreign assets, percentage of foreign income, and number of geographic segments (international diversification). 
Corresponding results are available upon request. 
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Based on Table 9, we find that !12_3#' continues to have a significant effect even 
after considering these additional variables. This provides further confirmation of the 
robustness of our main results. 
 
 5. Conclusion 
This paper investigates the relation between the cultural background of CFOs and the 
risk of future stock price crashes. Consistent with the conjecture that individuals with strong 
UAI prefer certainty over ambiguity, we find that firms with CFOs who have stronger UAI 
experience lower future stock price crash risk. This significant and negative impact dominates 
even the effect of CEOs’ and the board’s UAI. The results are robust to controlling for potential 
endogeneity by applying firm-fixed effect regressions, a difference-in-differences specification, 
and a propensity score matching procedure. Additional analyses further suggest that the effect 
of CFO UAI is stronger when firms have higher information asymmetry, and when firms are 
riskier. Finally, robustness tests highlight that the role of CFO UAI is more pronounced when 
the CFO is more likely to strongly influence firm decisions. We also find that the effect of CFO 
UAI on stock price crash risk remains after controlling for other executive characteristics (i.e., 
age, tenure, and gender), financial reporting quality, corporate governance quality, CFO equity 
incentives, other cultural dimensions (i.e., power distance, individualism, and masculinity), and 
foreignness of CFOs. 
This paper provides valuable implications for both scholars and practitioners. First, in 
addition to firm fundamental features, we suggest that managerial cultural background provides 
capital market participants with subtle but important information in evaluating firms and 
making investment decisions. More importantly, we find that cultural dimension affects not 
only managerial behaviour across countries, as suggested by prior literature, but also managers 
with different backgrounds but who work in the same country. Second, this paper highlights 
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the importance of linking specific executives to specific firm aspects. In particular, we highlight 
the importance of CFOs in affecting corporate extreme downside risk, which is an outcome of 
high importance to capital market participants.  
In summary, this paper presents consistent results that CFO cultural background, 
especially the uncertainty avoidance tendency, has a significant influence on firm decisions 
and outcomes. By going beyond the effect of CEO and board characteristics examined in prior 
research, this study encourages capital market participants to also consider vital CFO 
characteristics when making investment decisions. 
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Appendix A: Variable definitions   
Variable Definition 
Dependent variables: Price crash risk measures !239: The difference between the number of firm-specific weekly returns 
exceeding 3.20 standard deviations below the mean firm-specific 
weekly return over the fiscal year, and the number of firm-specific 
weekly returns exceeding 3.20 standard deviations above the mean 
firm-specific weekly return. 9!$(CD The negative skewness of firm-specific weekly returns during the 
fiscal year period. E32F; The natural logarithm of the ratio of the standard deviation of firm-
specific weekly returns for down-weeks to that for up-weeks. For 
a firm over a fiscal year period, down-weeks are defined as all 
weeks with firm-specific weekly returns below the annual mean, 
and up-weeks are all weeks with firm-specific weekly returns 
above the annual mean.  
 
Test variables: CFO cultural background !12_3#' Country-level Hofstede uncertainty avoidance index according to 
CFO nationality.  
 
Control variables ∆:3"9 The change in average monthly stock turnover compared to the 
previous fiscal year. Monthly stock turnover is defined as the ratio 
of monthly trading volume to average number of shares 
outstanding. "C: The mean of firm-specific weekly returns during one fiscal year. $:E_"C: The standard deviation of firm-specific weekly returns during one 
fiscal year. $'cC The natural logarithm of a firm’s market capitalisation at the end 
of one fiscal year. d/e The ratio of the market value of equity to book value. ;CF The ratio of long-term debt to total assets. "2# The return on assets, which is the ratio of income before 
extraordinary items to closing total assets.  
 
Additional control variables !C2_3#' Country-level Hofstede uncertainty avoidance index according to 
CEO nationality. e2#"E_3#' The average UAI of board members, excluding the CEO and the CFO. !C2_#ÖC Age of CEO. !C2_:C93"C Tenure of CEO. !C2_ÖC9EC" An indicator variable that equals 1 if a CEO is female, and 0 
otherwise. !12_#ÖC Age of CFO. !12_:C93"C Tenure of CFO. !12_ÖC9EC" An indicator variable that equals 1 if a CFO is female, and 0 
otherwise. 
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2l#Ñ3C The previous three years’ moving sum of the absolute value of 
annual performance-adjusted discretionary accruals, where the 
discretionary accruals are estimated following Kothari et al. 
(2005). 2l#Ñ3CI The square of 2l#Ñ3C. !_$!2"C The conservatism score estimated following Khan and Watts 
(2009). e2#"E_$'cC The total number of directors on a firm’s board. E3#;':Ü An indicator variable that equals 1 if the CEO is the chairman, and 
0 otherwise. 9CE_"#:'2 The proportion of non-executive directors. CÑ3':Ü_'9!C9:'FC The ratio of equity-based incentives over total compensation. !12_lE'	 Country-level Hofstede power distance index according to CFO 
nationality. !12_'EF	 Country-level Hofstede individualism index according to CFO 
nationality. !12_d#$	 Country-level Hofstede masculinity index according to CFO 
nationality. 12"C'Ö9_$#;C$ The percentage of foreign sales of a firm. e2#"E_12"C'Ö9 The percentage of non-British directors on a firm’s board. !12_3$# An indicator variable that equals 1 if a CFO is American, and 0 
otherwise. !12_12"C'Ö9 An indicator variable that equals 1 if a CFO is not British, and 0 
otherwise. 
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Figure 1. CFO turnover and stock price crash risk 
 
 
 
Notes: Figure 1 presents the average price crash risk around the CFO turnover event. The sample consists of firm 
year observations three years pre- and post CFO turnover event, excluding the event year. For both Panel A and 
Panel B, the vertical axis represents three different measures of price crash risk, whereas the horizontal axis 
represents the corresponding average values of price crash risk.   
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Table 1. CFO nationality distribution 
Nationality Freq. Percent Cum. UAI 
American 97 1.53 1.53 0.46 
Australian 35 0.55 2.08 0.51 
Brazilian 2 0.03 2.11 0.76 
British 5,925 93.29 95.4 0.35 
Canadian 6 0.09 95.5 0.48 
Dutch 11 0.17 95.67 0.53 
French 40 0.63 96.3 0.86 
German 1 0.02 96.32 0.65 
Indian 1 0.02 96.33 0.40 
Irish 151 2.38 98.71 0.35 
Israeli 2 0.03 98.74 0.81 
Italian 1 0.02 98.76 0.75 
Malaysian 3 0.05 98.8 0.36 
New Zealander 14 0.22 99.02 0.49 
Norwegian 4 0.06 99.09 0.50 
Singaporean 2 0.03 99.12 0.08 
South African 49 0.77 99.89 0.49 
Swedish 5 0.08 99.97 0.29 
Swiss 2 0.03 100 0.58 
Total 6,351 100   
Notes: Table 1 presents the distribution of CFO nationality, including frequency, percentage, and UAI, for FTSE 
All-Share firms from 1999 to 2015. 
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Table 2. Summary Statistics 
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Number Mean Std Dev P25 Median P75 !"#$% 6351 -0.049 0.639 0.000 0.000 0.000 $!&'() 6351 -0.048 0.853 -0.518 -0.090 0.351 *#+", 6351 -0.057 0.559 -0.414 -0.074 0.279 !-"_#/0 6351 0.358 0.049 0.350 0.350 0.350 &%*_1(% 6351 0.044 0.024 0.028 0.037 0.053 1(% 6351 -0.122 0.149 -0.138 -0.069 -0.037 ∆%#1$ 6351 0.000 0.037 -0.015 0.000 0.014 &03( 6351 13.020 1.928 11.677 12.889 14.250 4/6 6351 2.656 3.931 1.110 1.900 3.240 ,(+ 6351 0.163 0.162 0.009 0.130 0.262 1"/ 6351 0.045 0.111 0.018 0.057 0.095 
Panel B: Correlation Matrix 
 !"#$% $!&'() *#+", !-"_#/0 &%*_1(% 1(% ∆%#1$ &03( 4/6 ,(+ $!&'() 0.790          *#+", 0.651 0.901         !-"_#/0 -0.006 -0.002 0.002        &%*_1(% 0.066 0.134 0.122 -0.007       1(% -0.066 -0.126 -0.115 0.008 -0.966      ∆%#1$ 0.033 0.060 0.039 -0.003 0.043 -0.040     &03( 0.061 0.055 0.072 0.127 -0.493 0.422 0.014    4/6 -0.039 -0.067 -0.078 0.020 -0.109 0.090 0.005 0.168   ,(+ 0.021 0.028 0.044 0.004 -0.051 0.018 0.016 0.192 -0.029  1"/ -0.061 -0.093 -0.096 0.034 -0.451 0.456 0.001 0.294 0.158 0.008 
Notes: Table 2 Panel A presents the descriptive statistics and Table 2 Panel B presents the Pearson correlation coefficients between any two key variables (values in bold are 
significant at a 1% level). Definitions of the key variables are provided in the Appendix A. Continuous variables are winsorised at the 1st and 99th percentile.
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Table 3. CFO Cultural Background and Stock Price Crash Risk 
 !"#$% $!&'() *#+", 
 (1) (2) (3) -./_123456 -0.329** -0.504*** -0.350***  (-2.51) (-2.85) (-3.12) 7-89:;456 0.023** 0.020 0.012  (2.15) (1.31) (1.29) 8<=_>:<456 4.221*** 6.307*** 3.256**  (2.60) (2.93) (2.44) >:<456 0.694*** 0.862*** 0.387**  (2.99) (2.76) (2.03) ∆<1>7456 0.068 0.166 -0.015  (0.30) (0.57) (-0.08) 83@:456 0.051*** 0.084*** 0.063***  (8.74) (9.93) (11.79) A/C456 0.003 0.006** 0.003**  (1.42) (2.09) (2.09) D:E456 0.023 0.044 0.041  (0.39) (0.54) (0.77) >/2456 -0.011 -0.037 -0.020  (-0.12) (-0.30) (-0.25) 3FGHIJHKG -0.582*** -1.537*** -1.280*** 
 (-5.09) (-9.53) (-12.47) 
No. of Obs 6351 6351 6351 
Adj. >L 0.03 0.04 0.06 
Year effects Yes Yes Yes 
Industry effects Yes Yes Yes 
Notes: This table presents regression results for CFO UAI and stock price crash risk with FTSE All-Share firms 
from 1999 to 2015. Definitions of the key variables are provided in the Appendix A. Continuous variables are 
winsorised at the 1st and 99th percentile. T-statistics reported in parentheses are based on robust standard errors. 
*, ** and *** stand for significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
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Table 4. CFO UAI and Price Crash Risk: Controlling for CEO and Board UAI 
 !"#$% $!&'() *#+", 
 (1) (2) (3) -./_123456 -0.316** -0.454** -0.297**  (-2.30) (-2.44) (-2.47) -:/_123456 -0.029 0.003 -0.020  (-0.27) (0.02) (-0.23) C/2>=_123456 -0.035 -0.390 -0.362* 
 (-0.14) (-1.29) (-1.88) 7-89:;456 0.024** 0.021 0.013  (2.19) (1.38) (1.36) 8<=_>:<456 4.220*** 6.330*** 3.306**  (2.61) (2.95) (2.48) >:<456 0.695*** 0.865*** 0.391**  (2.99) (2.77) (2.05) ∆<1>7456 0.068 0.165 -0.018  (0.30) (0.56) (-0.10) 83@:456 0.051*** 0.087*** 0.066***  (8.10) (9.57) (11.36) A/C456 0.003 0.006** 0.003**  (1.42) (2.06) (2.03) D:E456 0.022 0.042 0.039  (0.38) (0.51) (0.74) >/2456 -0.012 -0.045 -0.028  (-0.13) (-0.36) (-0.35) 3FGHIJHKG -0.464*** -1.197*** -1.019*** 
 (-3.66) (-6.87) (-9.20) 
No. of Obs 6350 6350 6350 
Adj. >L 0.04 0.06 0.07 
Year effects Yes Yes Yes 
Industry effects Yes Yes Yes 
Notes: This table presents regression results for CFO UAI and stock price crash risk with FTSE All-Share firms 
from 1999 to 2015, controlling for CEO and board UAI. Definitions of the key variables are provided in the 
Appendix A. Continuous variables are winsorised at the 1st and 99th percentile. T-statistics reported in 
parentheses are based on robust standard errors. *, ** and *** stand for significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels, 
respectively. 
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Table 5. CFO UAI and Price Crash Risk: Controlling for Endogeneity 
 !"#$% $!&'() *#+", 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Panel A: Firm-fixed effects -./_123456 -0.537** -0.537** -0.399*** 
 (-2.06) (-2.16) (-2.72) 
No. of Obs 6351 6351 6351 
Adj. >L 0.03 0.06 0.07 
Year effects Yes Yes Yes 
Firm effects Yes Yes Yes 
Panel B: Difference-in-differences M/8< -0.006 -0.078* -0.029 
 (-0.19) (-1.89) (-1.03) M/8< × -./_=/;7 0.120 0.196 0.183 
 (0.97) (1.32) (1.64) M/8< × -./_1M -0.152* -0.172* -0.110* 
 (-1.79) (-1.77) (-1.67) 
No. of Obs 2602 2602 2602 
Adj. >L 0.05 0.08 0.08 
Year effects Yes Yes Yes 
Firm effects Yes Yes Yes 
Panel C: Propensity score matching O-./_123456 -0.094* -0.117* -0.063 
 (-1.84) (-1.90) (-1.55) 
No. of Obs 512 512 512 
Adj. >L 0.02 0.01 0.05 
Year effects Yes Yes Yes 
Industry effects Yes Yes Yes 
Notes: This table presents the results for CFO UAI and stock price crash risk with FTSE All-Share firms from 
1999 to 2015 using firm-fixed effect regressions (Panel A), difference-in-differences specification (Panel B), and 
propensity score matching approaches (Panel C). A full set of controls are included, but are not reported for 
simplicity (available upon request). M/8< is an indicator variable which is equal to 1 if the firm-year is post-
turnover event, and 0 otherwise. -./_1M is an indicator variable which is equal to 1 if the incoming CFO has 
stronger UAI than the incumbent CFO, and 0 otherwise. -./_=/;7 is an indicator variable which is equal to 1 
if the incoming CFO has weaker UAI than the incumbent CFO, and 0 otherwise. O-./_123 is an indicator 
variable which is equal to 1 if the firms retain CFOs with above industry median UAI, and 0 otherwise. Definitions 
of the key variables are provided in the Appendix A. Continuous variables are winsorised at the 1st and 99th 
percentile. T-statistics reported in parentheses are based on robust standard errors. *, ** and *** stand for 
significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
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Table 6. Subsample Analyses: Information Asymmetry 
 !"#$% !"#$% $!&'() $!&'() *#+", *#+", 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Panel A: Analyst coverage 
 High Low High Low High Low -./_123456 -0.081 -0.634*** -0.047 -0.803*** -0.138 -0.442**  (-0.50) (-2.86) (-0.23) (-2.66) (-1.17) (-2.08) 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
No. of Obs 2919 3432 2919 3432 2919 3432 
Adj. >L 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.03 0.05 
Panel B: Bid-ask spread 
 High Low High Low High Low -./_123456 -0.585** -0.177 -0.912*** -0.226 -0.646*** -0.168  (-2.17) (-1.27) (-2.65) (-1.22) (-3.07) (-1.32) 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
No. of Obs 3238 3108 3238 3108 3238 3108 
Adj. >L 0.04 0.01 0.05 0.02 0.06 0.02 
Panel C: Financial statement comparability 
 High Low High Low High Low -./_123456 0.047 -0.481** -0.192 -0.787*** -0.214 -0.613*** 
 (0.30) (-1.97) (-0.63) (-2.95) (-1.17) (-3.77) 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
No. of Obs 2071 2041 2071 2041 2071 2041 
Adj. >L 0.02 0.04 0.03 0.05 0.05 0.06 
Notes: This table presents subsample regression results for CFO UAI and stock price crash risk with FTSE All-
Share firms from 1999 to 2015, focusing on information asymmetry. 2FPQRSG	JUVHIPWH is the number of analysts 
following. CXY − PS[	SKIHPY is the annual average bid-ask spread calculated using daily ratio of the difference 
between ask price and bid price to the midpoint of ask price and bid price. .XFPFJXPQ	SGPGH\HFG	JU\KPIP]XQXGR 
is the firm-level financial statement comparability calculated as the average of the four highest comparability 
scores for all X-^ firm pairs in the same industry during period G. DHVHIPWH is the ratio of long-term debt to total 
assets. MHIJHFGPWH	U_	XFYHKHFYHG	YXIHJGUIS is the ratio of the number of independent directors to the total 
number of directors on the board. Definitions of the key variables are provided in the Appendix A. All continuous 
variables are winsorised at the 1st and 99th percentile. T-statistics reported in parentheses are based on robust 
standard errors. *, ** and *** stand for significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
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Table 7. Subsample Analyses: Firm Risk 
 !"#$% !"#$% $!&'() $!&'() *#+", *#+", 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Panel A: Cash flow volatility 
 High Low High Low High Low -./_123456 -0.521*** -0.178 -0.844*** -0.222 -0.455** -0.184 
 (-3.06) (-0.97) (-2.88) (-0.93) (-2.21) (-1.32) 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
No. of Obs 2912 2889 2912 2889 2912 2889 
Adj. >L 0.03 0.02 0.04 0.04 0.06 0.05 
Panel B: Earnings volatility 
 High Low High Low High Low -./_123456 -0.320 -0.235 -0.577** -0.357 -0.427** -0.197 
 (-1.52) (-0.99) (-2.09) (-1.04) (-2.42) (-0.96) 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
No. of Obs 3157 3162 3157 3162 3157 3162 
Adj. >L 0.03 0.04 0.04 0.05 0.06 0.06 
Panel C: Return volatility 
 High Low High Low High Low -./_123456 -0.504** -0.208 -0.792*** -0.259 -0.588*** -0.158 
 (-2.23) (-1.14) (-3.05) (-1.20) (-3.27) (-1.29) 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
No. of Obs 3235 3111 3235 3111 3235 3111 
Adj. >L 0.04 0.02 0.05 0.04 0.07 0.05 
Panel D: Expected default frequency 
 High Low High Low High Low -./_123456 -0.415* -0.253 -0.678* -0.351 -0.376 -0.367** 
 (-1.69) (-1.28) (-1.93) (-1.37) (-1.51) (-2.55) 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
No. of Obs 2919 2536 2919 2536 2919 2536 
Adj. >L 0.04 0.02 0.05 0.03 0.06 0.05 
Notes: This table presents subsample regression results for CFO UAI and stock price crash risk with FTSE All-
Share firms from 1999 to 2015, focusing on firm risk. -PSℎ	_QUa	VUQPGXQXGR is the standard deviation of quarterly 
cash flows from operations over the 16 quarters scaled by total debt. :PIFXFWS	VUQPGXQXGR  is the standard 
deviation of past eight earnings changes scaled by the average book asset over the past eight quarters. >HGbIF	VUQPGXQXGR is the annualised volatility calculated using monthly stock returns from the previous year. :cKHJGHY	YH_PbQG	_IHdbHFJR is the probability that the value of a firm’s assets will be less than the face value 
of its debt. Definitions of the key variables are provided in the Appendix A. All continuous variables are 
winsorised at the 1st and 99th percentile. T-statistics reported in parentheses are based on robust standard errors. 
*, ** and *** stand for significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
  
44 
 
Table 8. Subsample Analyses: CFO Influence 
 !"#$% !"#$% $!&'() $!&'() *#+", *#+", 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Panel A: CFO age 
 High Low High Low High Low -./_123456 -0.357** -0.355* -0.659*** -0.366 -0.516*** -0.231 
 (-2.38) (-1.65) (-2.72) (-1.63) (-3.75) (-1.43) 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
No. of Obs 2903 3448 2903 3448 2903 3448 
Adj. >L 0.03 0.04 0.04 0.05 0.05 0.06 
Panel B: CFO relative pay 
 High Low High Low High Low -./_123456 -0.734*** 0.144 -0.873** 0.068 -0.430 -0.136 
 (-2.76) (0.92) (-2.42) (0.33) (-1.59) (-1.03) 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
No. of Obs 3096 3158 3096 3158 3096 3158 
Adj. >L 0.03 0.03 0.05 0.04 0.06 0.06 
Notes: This table presents subsample regression results for CFO UAI and stock price crash risk with FTSE All-
Share firms from 1999 to 2015, focusing on CFO influence. -./	age is the age of CFO. -:/	IHQPGXVH	KPR is 
the ratio of the CFO’s total compensation excluding equity-based awards to the CEO’s total compensation. 
Definitions of the key variables are provided in the Appendix A. All continuous variables are winsorised at the 
1st and 99th percentile. T-statistics reported in parentheses are based on robust standard errors. *, ** and *** 
stand for significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
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Table 9. CFO UAI and Price Crash Risk: Controlling for Additional Controls 
 !"#$% $!&'() *#+", 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Panel A: Controlling for other executive characteristics -./_123456 -0.349** -0.494*** -0.341***  (-2.49) (-2.61) (-2.69) -:/_2h:456 0.006 -0.041 0.013  (0.10) (-0.48) (0.24) -:/_<:71>:456 -0.005 -0.021** -0.017***  (-0.58) (-2.01) (-2.63) -:/_h:7=:>456 -0.044 -0.096 -0.032 
 (-0.56) (-0.96) (-0.50) -./_2h:456 -0.002 -0.001 -0.001  (-1.14) (-0.52) (-0.48) -./_<:71>:456 -0.001 -0.001 -0.000  (-0.62) (-0.25) (-0.07) -./_h:7=:>456 -0.031 -0.064 -0.054* 
 (-0.82) (-1.32) (-1.71) 
No. of Obs 6240 6240 6240 
Adj. >L 0.03 0.04 0.06 
Panel B: Controlling for financial reporting quality -./_123456 -0.238* -0.462** -0.355***  (-1.81) (-2.58) (-3.16) /M2i1:456 0.146 0.214 0.044  (0.85) (0.85) (0.27) /M2i1:456L  -0.012 0.090 0.264  (-0.05) (0.23) (0.99) -_8-/>:456 -0.050 0.017 0.031  (-1.17) (0.28) (0.79) 
No. of Obs 5217 5217 5217 
Adj. >L 0.03 0.04 0.06 
Panel C: Controlling for corporate governance characteristics -./_123456 -0.322** -0.488*** -0.346***  (-2.46) (-2.78) (-3.12) C/2>=_83@:456 0.000 -0.020 -0.015  (0.01) (-0.39) (-0.44) =12D3<j456 -0.008 0.016 -0.001  (-0.39) (0.62) (-0.04) 7:=_>2<3/456 0.065 0.055 0.018  (1.03) (0.65) (0.30) 
No. of Obs 6351 6351 6351 
Adj. >L 0.03 0.04 0.06 
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(Continued) 
Panel D: Controlling for the CFO equity incentives -./_123456 -0.322** -0.487*** -0.341***  (-2.43) (-2.72) (-3.01) :i13<j_37-:7<3E:456 0.039 0.093** 0.050  (1.09) (1.97) (1.62) 
No. of Obs 6351 6351 6351 
Adj. >L 0.03 0.04 0.06 
Panel E: Controlling for Hofstede’s cultural dimensions -./_123456 -0.326 -0.564** -0.332*  (-1.62) (-2.33) (-1.94) -./_M=3456 -0.136 -0.080 -0.043  (-0.56) (-0.28) (-0.20) -./_3=E456 0.083 -0.042 0.061  (0.54) (-0.21) (0.42) -./_A28456 -0.216 -0.190 -0.059  (-1.55) (-0.65) (-0.28) 
No. of Obs 6351 6351 6351 
Adj. >L 0.03 0.04 0.06 
Panel F: Controlling for the effect of internationalisation -./_123456 -0.263** -0.372** -0.239** 
 (-2.03) (-2.23) (-2.15) ./>:3h7_82D:8456 0.047 0.063 0.025 
 (1.39) (1.37) (0.84) C/2>=_./>:3h7456 -0.061 -0.163** -0.129** 
 (-1.05) (-2.11) (-2.56) 
No. of Obs 5686 5686 5686 
Adj. >L 0.03 0.04 0.06 
Panel G: Controlling for the most frequent foreign CFOs -./_123456 -0.324** -0.505*** -0.357***  (-2.41) (-2.79) (-3.11) -./_182456 -0.008 0.001 0.011  (-0.13) (0.01) (0.22) 
No. of Obs 6351 6351 6351 
Adj. >L 0.03 0.04 0.06 
Panel H: Controlling for the effect of CFO foreignness -./_123456 -0.231 -0.401* -0.261*  (-1.44) (-1.80) (-1.75) -./_./>:3h7456 -0.032 -0.034 -0.029  (-0.89) (-0.73) (-0.90) 
No. of Obs 6351 6351 6351 
Adj. >L 0.03 0.04 0.06 
Notes: This table presents the results for CFO UAI and stock price crash risk with FTSE All-Share firms from 
1999 to 2015, controlling for additional controls. A full set of controls are included, but are not reported for 
simplicity (available upon request). Definitions of the key variables are provided in the Appendix A. Continuous 
variables are winsorised at the 1st and 99th percentile. T-statistics reported in parentheses are based on robust 
standard errors. *, ** and *** stand for significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
